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SPLIT OVER SEX: FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS AND 
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES SPLIT OVER SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
Darria Turner+ 
Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it shall be unlawful 
for public and private employers with 15 or more employees “to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . .”1  Since its enactment, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has 
definitively stated whether sex discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
protected under Title VII.  Because Congress and the Supreme Court have not 
explicitly provided for its protection, claims of sex discrimination based on 
sexual orientation are generally not cognizable under Title VII.2  For this reason, 
many courts have routinely held that the protections of Title VII do not extend 
to claims based on sexual orientation discrimination.3  Recently however, three 
circuits were faced with claims of sex discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and were compelled to decide whether to follow or reverse court precedent and 
allow discrimination claims based on sexual orientation to be heard.4 
In March 2017, in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital,5 the Eleventh Circuit 
ruled 2-1 that Title VII does not cover discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  It held that binding precedent in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,6 which 
established that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII . . 
. [,]” foreclosed such an action.7  In April 2017, the Second Circuit also held that 
sexual orientation was not covered under Title VII in Zarda v. Altitude Express, 
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 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–e-17 (2012). 
 2. CHARLES R. RICHEY, 1 MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS § 1:64 (2018). 
 3. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 80 (2nd Cir. 2017), overruled by, 883 
F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2017); 
Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 4. See Zarda, 855 F.3d at 79–80; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1250; Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. 
of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 5. 850 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 6. 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 7. Id. at 1255 (quoting Blum, 597 F.2d at 938). 
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Inc.8  However, in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana,9 after a 
rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit held that Title VII does provide protection 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Following the Seventh 
Circuit’s reversal, the Second Circuit agreed to rehear Zarda en banc, which 
overruled its current precedent and added to the circuit split on this issue.10 
This split has also created tension between the United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).11  
These agencies have taken opposing views on the Zarda rehearing.12  The DOJ 
argues that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not sex discrimination 
under Title VII.13  Conversely, the EEOC argues that “sexual orientation 
discrimination is, by definition, discrimination ‘because of . . . sex,’ in violation 
of Title VII.”14 
This Comment will explore the history of workplace sex discrimination cases 
based on sexual orientation under Title VII, how the current circuit split should 
be resolved, and the impact these cases will have on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace.  Part I 
will discuss the history and evolution of sex discrimination under Title VII.  It 
will begin with the enactment of the legislation and then will discuss how 
judicial interpretation of sex discrimination has changed through case law and 
administrative guidance. 
Part II will examine the current circuit split on whether Title VII’s protection 
against sex discrimination includes sexual orientation.  It will first discuss how 
each of the circuits interpret sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII, 
then analyze the basis upon which each circuit holds that sexual orientation is or 
is not protected by Title VII.  Lastly, in Part III, this Comment will argue that 
judicial interpretation should evolve to include sexual orientation in cases of 
protection from sex discrimination under Title VII.  This Comment will argue 
that the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is the appropriate 
resolution for sexual orientation under Title VII.  It will also discuss how the 
conflicting arguments from federal agencies, coupled with no guidance from 
Congress or the Supreme Court, could potentially lead to a myriad of workplace 
discrimination issues if the judiciary fails to resolve the conflict. 
                                               
 8. 855 F.3d 76, 82 (2nd Cir. 2017), overruled by, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) 
 9. 853 F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 10. Zarda, 855 F.3d at 82, overruled by, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d 
Cir. 2018). 
 11. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *15–16, *21, Zarda v. Altitide 
Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 3775). 
 12. Id. at 15; En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants and in Favor of Reversal at 22–23, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 
Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC]. 
 13. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at 1. 
 14. Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC, supra note 12, at 5. 
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I. WHAT IT MEANS TO BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST “BECAUSE OF . . . 
SEX”15 
A. Sex Discrimination is Brought Within Title VII’s Purview 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, prohibits as an “unlawful employment practice,” discrimination 
“against any individual with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.”16  This legislation began by President John F. Kennedy 
making appeals to Congress to enact legislation regarding civil rights.17  
President Kennedy’s proposed civil rights legislation sought to emphasize 
voting rights, public accommodations, employment discrimination, and 
education to counter the “growing moral crisis in American race relations.”18  
However, President Kennedy’s concern did not include discrimination because 
of sex.19  Yet when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, it 
included discrimination “because of . . . sex.”20 
Representative Howard Smith introduced the amendment just two days before 
the bill moved from the House to the Senate, without prior hearing or debate.21  
Smith opposed the civil rights legislation, so adding sex discrimination was his 
effort to block it.22  However, his effort failed and sex discrimination fell within 
the purview of impermissible actions under Title VII.23  Notably, Representative 
Martha Griffith began to advocate for Smith’s amendment because she believed 
that not adding “sex” to the bill would leave white women unprotected.24  
Following Griffith’s comments, four other representatives also raised the 
argument that white women would be left behind.25  This support of Smith’s 
                                               
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights (Feb. 
28, 1963), www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9581; see also President John F. Kennedy, Special 
Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities (June 19, 1963), www.preside 
ncy.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9283. 
 18. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, supra 
note 17. 
 19. Id. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 21. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (introductory statement of Rep. Smith).  Representative 
Smith voted against final passage of the bill.  See H.R. 7152. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Adoption of 
a Resolution (H. Res. 789) Providing For House Approval of the Bill as Amended by the Senate., 
GOVTRACK (July 2, 1964), www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/88-1964/h182. 
 22. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986–87 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that Representative 
Smith proposed the amendment as “a last-minute attempt to block the bill”). 
 23. See 110 CONG. REC. 2804–05. 
 24. Id. at 2578.  Representative Griffith stated that “I rise in support of the amendment 
primarily because I feel as a white woman when this bill has passed . . . that white women will be 
last at the hiring gate.”  Id. 
 25. Id. at 2583 (statements of Representatives Tuten, Pool, Andrews, and Rivers). 
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amendment seemingly interfered with his plan to derail the entire bill.26  The 
debate closed and Smith’s amendment passed in the House twice.27  It first 
passed by a vote of 168 to 133,28 then by a vote of 290 to 130.29 
1. Congress Fails to Define Scope and Meaning of Sex Discrimination 
Since the amendment was included at the tail end of the legislative process, 
there is no substantive legislative history defining the scope and meaning of sex 
discrimination.30  Though the EEOC has provided little guidance on the 
application of “because of sex” within Title VII, one of the reasons Congress 
created the EEOC was to interpret and enforce the prohibition of sex 
discrimination.31  To enforce these laws, the EEOC was given the authority to 
investigate accusations of discrimination against covered employers that are 
submitted by an applicant or employee who believes that unlawful 
discrimination has occurred.32  The EEOC also provides guidelines on how the 
laws and regulations apply.33  Though the guidelines are “not controlling upon 
the courts by reason of their authority, [they] do constitute a body of experience 
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.”34  However, the EEOC’s initial guidance focused primarily on 
protection of the “woman worker.”35  This could be because many of the 
                                               
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 2584, 2804–05. 
 28. Id. at 2584. 
 29. Id. at 2804–05. 
 30. Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986).  The Court in Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson noted: 
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last 
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives.  The principal argument in 
opposition to the amendment was that “sex discrimination” was sufficiently different 
from other types of discrimination that it ought to receive separate legislative treatment.  
This argument was defeated, the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with 
little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against 
discrimination based on “sex.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) (stating 
that “[t]he legislative history of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination is notable primarily 
for its brevity”). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2012).  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
is an independent and bipartisan federal agency that enforces federal laws that make it illegal to 
discriminate in the workplace. Id.  It is governed by five Commissioners, who are appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate.  Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. EEOC Subregulatory Guidance, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/ind 
ex.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
 34. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141–42. 
 35. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,926–27 (Dec. 2, 1965) 
(codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604) (listing the Equal Employment Opportunity 
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commissioners did not believe that sex categorically was a legitimate addition 
to the legislation.36 
Consequently, without Congress’s guidance on the definition of “sex” under 
Title VII, courts were inclined to interpret it narrowly.37  In many cases, courts 
rationalized that Congress’s limited discussion on the “because of sex” provision 
meant that Congress had “only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind” when 
passing the bill.38  Therefore, courts defined “sex” as biological sex and 
interpreted the provision to only prohibit discrimination against biological men 
and women for being a man or being a woman.39  Over time, however, courts 
began interpreting “sex” in Title VII more broadly.40 
B. Evolution of Discrimination Because of “Sex” Under Title VII 
After Title VII’s enactment, cases alleging discrimination because of “sex” 
were tried throughout the U.S. court system.  The earlier cases tended to focus 
on “sex” primarily from a biological standpoint.41  In Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp.,42 a female job applicant filed suit under Title VII alleging that she was 
discriminated against because of sex.  In this case, the employer informed her 
that they were not accepting job applications from women with school-aged 
children, despite accepting applications from men with school-aged children.43  
                                               
Commission’s interpretations of Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination in employment because 
of sex). 
 36. CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES 1945–
1968 187 (1989). 
 37. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084–87 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that the 
lack of legislative history means that the sex provision does not forbid discrimination based on 
transsexuality); Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145–46 (holding that Title VII’s sex provision does not protect 
against discrimination because of pregnancy); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 
386 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that there is little legislative history to assist courts with the judicial 
interpretation of the sex provision). 
 38. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that 
the sole purpose of Title VII is to ensure the equal treatment of men and women because “[c]ongress 
has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ to its traditional meaning”); see also 
De Santis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 39. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 n.4; see also Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
 40. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 41. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 622 n.4; see City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (maintaining that actions based on sex stereotypes are discriminatory); 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (holding that distinctions based on sex 
may not be discriminatory if they are relevant to “bona fide occupational qualification[s]”); Diaz 
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386, 388–89 (5th Cir. 1971) (indicating that the 
law was intended to fight prejudices based on sex, so the qualifications that discriminate must be 
“necessary to the business”). 
 42. 400 U.S. 542, 543, 547 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“When performance 
characteristics of an individual are involved, even when parental roles are concerned, employment 
opportunity may be limited only by employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the 
applicant.”). 
 43. Id. at 543 (majority opinion). 
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The Supreme Court held that Title VII’s anti-sex discrimination provisions were 
applicable to an employer’s refusal to accept applications from women, but not 
men.44 
Similarly, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,45 a man applied for 
a position as a flight attendant with Pan American Airlines. He was not selected 
based on Pan American’s policy of only hiring women for the flight attendant 
position.46  The court held that Title VII protections applied to men as well as 
women.47  Soon after Phillips and Diaz, the Supreme Court in City of Los 
Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,48 delineated what 
discrimination “because of” one’s sex is under the statute.  The Court wrote: 
 There are both real and fictional differences between women and 
men.  It is true that the average man is taller than the average woman; 
it is not true that the average woman driver is more accident prone than 
the average man.  Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, an 
employer could fashion his personnel policies on the basis of 
assumptions about the differences between men and women, whether 
or not the assumptions were valid. 
 It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be 
predicated on mere “stereotyped” impressions about the 
characteristics of males or females.  Myths and purely habitual 
assumptions about a woman’s inability to perform certain kinds of 
work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified 
individuals, or for paying them less.49 
1. Courts Slowly Expand the Definition of “Because of Sex” 
Following this case, courts slowly began to expand the definition of 
“because of sex” discrimination under Title VII.  One of the first cases to 
attempt to expand this definition was the 1984 case, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 
Inc.50  Kenneth Ulane was an Eastern Airlines pilot for over 10 years before he 
was fired after he underwent sex reassignment surgery and became Karen 
Ulane.51  After her surgery, Ulane received a revised birth certificate indicating 
her sex as female, and the Federal Aviation Administration certified her for 
flight status as a female.52  The airline was unaware of Ulane’s transsexuality 
                                               
 44. Id. at 544. 
 45. 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that “[i]n attempting to read Congress’ intent 
in these circumstances . . . it is reasonable to assume, from a reading of the statute itself, that one 
of Congress’ main goals was to provide equal access to the job market for both men and women”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 388–89. 
 48. 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978). 
 49. Id. at 707. 
 50. 742 F.2d 1081, 1085–87 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 51. Id. at 1082–83. 
 52. Id. at 1083. 
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until she tried to return to work after her surgery.53  After she was discharged in 
1981, Ulane filed suit against Eastern Airlines alleging that it violated Title VII 
because she was discriminated against both as a female and as a transsexual.54  
The federal district court found that Ulane was fired because she was a 
transsexual in violation of Title VII.55  The district court indicated that while the 
term “sex” did not incorporate “sexual preference[,]” it did incorporate “sexual 
identity.”56 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.57  The 
Seventh Circuit noted that while some may find that “sex” means “sexual 
identity[,]” under the principle of statutory construction, words should be given 
their plain, ordinary meaning.58  The court highlighted that in Title VII,  the 
plain, ordinary meaning of “sex” is that “it is unlawful to discriminate against 
women because they are women and against men because they are men.”59  The 
court also noted that: 
The words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person 
who has a sexual identity disorder, i.e., a person born with a male body 
who believes himself to be female, or a person born with a female 
body who believes herself to be male; a prohibition against 
discrimination based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with a 
prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sexual 
identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which they were born.  
The dearth of legislative history on section 2000e–2(a)(1) strongly 
reinforces the view that that section means nothing more than its plain 
language implies.60 
The court further concluded that if Eastern Airlines discriminated against 
Ulane, it was not because she was female, but because she was a transsexual, 
which is not a violation of Title VII.61  Though this case did not successfully 
expand the definition of “because of sex[,]” it was subsequently expanded to 
include sexual harassment.62 
                                               
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1082. 
 55. Id. at 1084. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1087. 
 58. Id. at 1085. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  at 1085–86 (stating that “[c]ongress never considered nor intended that this 1964 
legislation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex” and “sex should be given a 
narrow, traditional interpretation . . . ”). 
 61. Id. at 1087. 
 62. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72–73 (1986). 
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2. Discrimination “Because of Sex” Includes Sexual Harassment 
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that sexual 
harassment was discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.63  Mechelle 
Vinson was an employee of Meritor Savings Bank where she was sexually 
harassed by an executive of the bank.64  She was discharged for “excessive 
absenteeism” after she took sick leave because of the harassment she 
experienced.65  Following her discharge, Vinson brought a Title VII action 
against both Taylor and the bank, alleging that Taylor harassed her because of 
her sex.66  The EEOC guidelines specified that “sexual harassment . . . is a form 
of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.”67  Relying on those guidelines, 
the Court held that Title VII affords employees protection from sexual 
harassment.68  The Court also noted that “when a supervisor sexually harasses a 
subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ 
on the basis of sex.”69  Just a few years after Vinson, the Court seemed to 
embrace similar logic as the district court in Ulane, finding that “sex” 
necessarily included “sexual identity.”70 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,71 Ann Hopkins was a senior manager in an 
accounting firm who was denied partnership because other partners thought she 
did not act how a woman should act.  Several partners suggested that she was 
“overly aggressive, unduly harsh,” “macho[,]” and that she “overcompensated 
for being a woman.”72  The partners also expressed that she would have a better 
chance at partnership if she were “to take a course at charm school . . . ,” “walk 
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”73  The Court held that the firm 
discriminated against Hopkins because of “sex” as the partners engaged in “sex 
stereotyping.”74  The Court stated that: 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees 
by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated 
with their group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate 
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at 
                                               
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 59–60. 
 65. Id. at 60. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 65. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 64. 
 70. See id.; Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 71. 490 U.S. 228, 231–32, 237–38 (1989). 
 72. Id. at 235. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 257–58. 
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the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes.”75 
After Price Waterhouse, more courts began to recognize Title VII protections 
in cases of sex stereotyping.76  Courts also began to acknowledge that 
discrimination because of “sex” could be perpetrated by someone of the same 
sex.77 
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,78 Joseph Oncale worked on 
an eight-man oil platform crew.  After Oncale was forcibly subjected to 
humiliating sex-related actions by colleagues in the presence of the rest of the 
crew, including physical assaults in a sexual manner and threats of rape, he filed 
a claim of sex discrimination against his employer.79  The Court found that 
nothing in Title VII prevents one from bringing a claim of discrimination 
because of sex when both parties are of the same sex.80  In the unanimous 
opinion, Justice Scalia defended the Court’s interpretation of the statute by 
noting that: 
As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the 
workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was 
concerned with when it enacted Title VII.  But statutory prohibitions 
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.81 
Though this case did not expand the definition of “sex” to include sexual 
orientation, many cases were filed and tried on that basis.82  However, courts 
were still reluctant to grant judgment in favor of plaintiffs because several other 
courts held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.83  
Further, Congress had neither added sexual orientation as a protected trait nor 
defined discrimination because of “sex” to include sexual orientation 
discrimination.84 
                                               
 75. Id. at 251. 
 76. Arthur S. Leonard, Sexual Minority Rights in the Workplace, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 145, 153–
58 (2004/2005). 
 77. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 78. 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 79. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Leonard, supra note 76, at 152–53. 
 83. Id.  “[C]ourts having unanimously concluded that sexual orientation discrimination . . . is 
not covered by Title VII . . . tend to reject those harassment cases that are premised solely on anti-
gay motives.”  Id. 
 84. Velma Cheri Gay, “50 Years Later . . . Still Interpreting the Meaning of ‘Because of Sex’ 
Within Title VII and Whether It Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination”, 73 A.F. L. REV. 61, 
93 (2015). 
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C. EEOC’s Interpretation of Sexual Orientation Discrimination under Title 
VII 
Much like the courts, until recently, EEOC decisions uniformly ruled that 
sexual orientation discrimination was not prohibited sex discrimination under 
Title VII.85  Appeals heard by the Commission based on sexual orientation 
before 2015 were routinely dismissed for failure to state a claim.86 
1. Before 2015: EEOC Says Sexual Orientation Not Protected under Title 
VII 
In Morrison v. Department of the Navy,87  Richard Morrison filed a complaint 
with the agency alleging discrimination based on his sex when his male co-
worker told other employees he was gay; someone in the parking lot had seen 
him making out in a car with a man; and he was dying from AIDS.88  The agency 
dismissed the complaint and Morrison requested EEOC’s reconsideration of the 
decision.89  The EEOC found that sex discrimination under Title VII did “not 
apply to cases which raise issues regarding an individual’s perceived sexual 
preference or orientation.”90  The EEOC also noted that “[t]he federal courts 
have clearly expressed their opinion that claims of sex discrimination brought 
by homosexuals or those individuals perceived as homosexuals, are not within 
the purview of Title VII.”91  Similarly, in Angle v. Department of Agriculture, 
the EEOC found that Angle’s claim of discrimination because of his perceived 
sexual orientation was not a valid claim under Title VII.92  For this reason, 
plaintiffs could not successfully pursue a sexual orientation discrimination claim 
unless they “failed to conform to gender stereotypes.”93 
2. 2015: EEOC Reverses Course—Sexual Orientation Now Protected 
under Title VII 
In 2015, however, the EEOC reversed course on its longstanding history of 
agreeing with the courts in Baldwin v. Foxx.94  David Baldwin filed a formal 
                                               
 85. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *8, *11–12. 
 86. See Gay, supra note 84, at 106. 
 87. No. 05930964, 1994 WL 746296, at *1 (June 16, 1994). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at *1–2. 
 90. Id. at *3. 
 91. Id.; see De Santis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979); see also, 
Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 92. Angle v. Veneman, No. 01A32644, 2004 WL 764265, at *2 (Apr. 5, 2004).  The EEOC 
has consistently held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not actionable under Title 
VII.  See also, Barbagallo v. Henderson, No. 01980167, 2001 WL 802788, at *3 (July 5, 2001); 
Marucci v. Caldera, No. 01982644, 2000 WL 1637387, at *1 (Oct. 27, 2000). 
 93. Camille Patti, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College: Losing the Battle but Winning the 
War for Title VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination Protection, 26 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 133, 
136 (2017). 
 94. No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *1 (July 16, 2015). 
2019] Split Over Sex 195 
complaint with the EEOC against his employer, alleging that he was not 
promoted to a full-time air traffic controller at the Miami International Airport 
because he is gay.95  Despite the consensus among the federal circuit courts that 
Title VII did not cover sexual orientation discrimination, the EEOC issued an 
opinion recognizing that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination, 
and therefore within the scope of Title VII.96  The EEOC found that “‘[s]exual 
orientation’ as a concept cannot be defined or understood without reference to 
sex.”97 
The EEOC reasoned that Title VII protects against sexual orientation 
discrimination for three reasons: (1) “because it necessarily entails treating an 
employee less favorably because of the employee’s sex[;]”98 (2) “because it is 
associational discrimination on the basis of sex[;]”99 and (3) because it involves 
gender stereotyping, which has already been declared to be sex 
discrimination.100  The EEOC also noted an inherent discrepancy in the courts 
definition of “sex” under Title VII.101  Courts routinely had held that Congress 
in 1964 did not intend Title VII to apply to sexual orientation; yet in Oncale, the 
Supreme Court found that statutory provisions can be legitimately stretched, 
even absent congressional action, to cover “reasonably comparable evils.”102  
Since Baldwin, the EEOC has updated its guidance to include the prohibition of 
sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.103 
                                               
 95. Id. at *2. 
 96. Id. at *10. 
 97. Id. at *13.  “Sexual orientation refers to the sex of those to whom one is sexually and 
romantically attracted.”  Id. (quoting Definitions Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Diversity in APA Documents, APA, http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality-definitions.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2018)).  “It follows, then, that sexual orientation is inseparable from and 
inescapably linked to sex and, therefore, that allegations of sexual orientation discrimination 
involve sex-based considerations.  One can describe this inescapable link between allegations of 
sexual orientation discrimination and sex discrimination in a number of ways.”  Id. at *14. 
 98. Id. 
For example, assume that an employer suspends a lesbian employee for displaying a 
photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male employee for 
displaying a photo of his female spouse on his desk.  The lesbian employee in that 
example can allege that her employer took an adverse action against her that the employer 
would not have taken had she been male.  That is a legitimate claim under Title VII that 
sex was unlawfully taken into account in the adverse employment action. 
Id. at 14–15. 
 99. Id. at *17.  The EEOC determined that since “Title VII ‘on its face treats each of the 
enumerated categories’—race, color, religion, sex, and national origin —’exactly the same[,]’” 
associational sex discrimination should also be prohibited.  Id. at *19. 
 100. Id. at *20. 
 101. Id. at *24. 
 102. Id. at *25. 
 103. What You Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT 
Workers, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
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D. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Interpretation of Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination under Title VII 
While the EEOC has made the effort to expand the definition of “sex” to 
include sexual orientation, most federal appellate courts have not followed 
suit.104  The courts readily acknowledge that it is tough to make a distinction 
between sex and sexual orientation; nevertheless, they separate sexual 
orientation claims into two categories.105 
1. Gender Stereotyping 
The first category is sex discrimination based on gender stereotyping, in 
which courts have held there is Title VII protection.106  Following the decision 
in Price Waterhouse, plaintiffs have a better chance of surviving summary 
judgment on this type claim. 
In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that 
a male waiter had a cognizable sex discrimination claim after he was harassed 
by his male coworkers, who teased that he walked and carried his tray “like a 
woman,” called him by female pronouns, and insulted him with vulgar female 
terms, all because he did not conform to the stereotypical notions of a man.107  
The Eighth Circuit similarly held that a front desk clerk with a “slightly more 
masculine” and “tomboyish” appearance survived summary judgment when she 
was fired despite great performance, because she did not have the “pretty, . . . 
Midwestern girl look” that her new supervisor wanted.108 
2. Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
The second category is sexual orientation discrimination where it is held that 
there is no protection under Title VII.109  The facts in these cases are usually 
                                               
 104. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding 
that almost all circuits have defined “sex” in the same way) (citations omitted); Kalich v. AT&T 
Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 
290 (3d Cir. 2009); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005); Medina v. 
Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 
F.3d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 
1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 105. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination Under Title VII, PRACTICAL LAW 
LABOR & EMP’T, Practice Note W-007-8106. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 
Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 200–01 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that an openly 
gay employee survived a motion to dismiss when he was harassed by his supervisor, who perceived 
him to be effeminate and submissive). 
 108. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1036, 1041 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 109. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination Under Title VII, supra note 105. 
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analogous to the claims in the gender stereotype cases, yet plaintiffs generally 
do not survive summary judgment based on precedent.110 
In Simonton v. Runyon, a male postal worker filed suit under Title VII after 
suffering repeated abuse and harassment from his co-workers, who were aware 
of his sexual orientation.111  The Second Circuit dismissed Simonton’s 
complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.112  Likewise, in Blum v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that discharge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII when an employee in the customer 
account department filed a suit for wrongful termination based on his sexual 
preferences.113 
Much like the Second and Fifth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit also found 
“harassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation (and 
not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.”114  In 
Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc., the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of a male nurse’s Title VII claim alleging he was fired 
because he filed a grievance for harassment based on his sexual orientation.115  
In Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., a utility employee’s claim of sexual orientation 
discrimination was dismissed because the court held the problems that “resulted 
from his . . . apparent homosexuality” were not protected under Title VII.116 
3. The Seventh Circuit is the First Circuit to Reverse Course on Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination 
Since 2000, the Seventh Circuit has relied on both Hamner and Spearman as 
precedent to hold that “harassment based solely upon a person’s sexual 
preference or orientation (and not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment 
practice under Title VII.”117  In 2017, the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits 
                                               
 110. See id. 
 111. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2000).  Simonton was routinely verbally 
assaulted with comments such as “go fuck yourself, fag,” “suck my dick,” and “so you like it up 
the ass?”  Id.  Notes were placed on the wall in the employees’ bathroom with Simonton’s name 
and the name of celebrities who had died of AIDS.  Id.  Pornographic photographs were taped to 
his work area, male dolls were placed in his vehicle, and copies of Playgirl magazine were sent to 
his home.  Id.  Pictures of an erect penis were posted in his work place, as were posters stating that 
Simonton suffered from mental illness as a result of “bung hole disorder.”  Id.  There were repeated 
statements that Simonton was a “fucking faggot.”  Id. 
 112. Id. at 36; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 113. Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 114. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000); Hamner v. St. Vincent 
Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 115. Hamner, 224 F.3d at 704, 708. 
 116. Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1082, 1085. 
 117. Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084; Hamner, 224 F.3d at 704.  Both the Hamner and Spearman 
courts relied upon the Seventh Circuit’s 1984 case Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., which stated in 
dicta that “homosexuals and transvestites do not enjoy Title VII protection.”  Ulane v. E. Airlines, 
Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084 (supporting the 
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heard and dismissed sexual orientation discrimination claims.118  The Seventh 
Circuit became the first circuit to follow the EEOC in reversing its stance on 
sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.119  The other circuits, as well 
as the U.S. Department of Justice, continue to insist that Title VII does not 
provide protection for sexual orientation discrimination claims.120 
II. BUT DOES “SEX” MEAN SEXUAL ORIENTATION? 
A. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Split Over Whether “Sex” Includes Sexual 
Orientation 
1. Eleventh Circuit: Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital 
In 2015, Jameka Evans, a security officer at Georgia Regional Hospital 
(Georgia Regional), was “denied equal pay or work, harassed, and physically 
assaulted or battered.”121  Evans alleged that the chief of security repeatedly 
closed a door on her in a rude manner, that she experienced scheduling issues 
and a shift change, and that a less qualified individual was promoted as her 
supervisor.122  She also claimed that her new supervisor scrutinized and harassed 
her and that someone had tampered with her equipment.123  When Evans filed a 
complaint to human resources about the harassment, the senior human resources 
manager conducting the internal investigation asked her about her “sexuality.”124  
Evans then filed a complaint against Georgia Regional alleging that she was 
discriminated against because of her sexual orientation.125 
Evans believed she was targeted for termination based on her sex because she 
is a “gay female” and does not carry herself in a “traditional woman[ly] 
manner.”126  Evans also provided that it is “‘evident’ that she identif[ies] with 
                                               
conclusion that Title VII was meant to apply to discrimination against women because of their sex 
(citing Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085)); Hamner, 224 F.3d at 704, 707 (empowering the holding that 
sexual orientation is not a classification protected under Title VII) (citing Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085). 
 118. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2017), rehearing en banc, 
883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (affirming the lower court’s verdict in favor of the defendants); 
Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2017) (reversing the lower 
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims, but affirming the lower court’s judgment in all other 
respects); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming the lower 
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims in part, and vacating and remanding in part); Hively v. Ivy 
Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming the lower court’s dismissal of 
plaintiff’s claims despite criticism from the legislative body). 
 119. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341. 
 120. See Zarda, 855 F.3d at 82; Anonymous, 852 F.3d at 200–01; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1250; 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *33. 
 121. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1250–51. 
 122. Id. at 1250. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1250–51. 
 126. Id. at 1251. 
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the male gender[] because she present[s] herself” as such by wearing a “male 
uniform, low male haircut, shoes, etc.”127  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
dismissal of the case holding that binding precedent set forth in Blum foreclosed 
sexual orientation claims under Title VII.128  The court offered no additional 
reasoning why sex does not include sexual orientation; however, it held that sex 
does include gender non-conformity.129  In this case, the EEOC, supporting 
Evans, argued that the statement in Blum concerning the viability of a sexual 
orientation claim “is dicta and not binding precedent.”130  The court disagreed 
with the EEOC, noting the statement in Blum directly addressed the sexual 
orientation claim and was not dicta.131 
Evans and the EEOC also argued that the Supreme Court decisions in Price 
Waterhouse and Oncale support a finding that sexual orientation discrimination 
is covered under Title VII, but this was not persuasive to the court.132  It noted 
that even if claims for gender non-conformity and same-sex discrimination can 
be brought under Title VII, that does not allow them to depart from Blum and 
find that sexual orientation is actionable.133  The court also reasoned that “Price 
Waterhouse and Oncale are neither clearly on point nor contrary to Blum[,]” nor 
do they specifically address whether sexual orientation discrimination is 
prohibited by Title VII.134  Therefore, it analyzed “that Blum is binding 
precedent that has not been overruled by a clearly contrary opinion of the 
Supreme Court or of this Court sitting en banc.”135 
                                               
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1255; see Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch, 741 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (noting “[u]nder our prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow a binding precedent in 
this Circuit ‘unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court’”); see 
also Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that “[d]ischarge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII or Section 1981”). 
 129. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254–55 (holding that “the lower court erred because a gender non-
conformity claim is not ‘just another way to claim discrimination based on sexual orientation,’ but 
instead, constitutes a separate, distinct avenue for relief under Title VII”). 
 130. Id. at 1254; see also Blum, 597 F.2d at 938 (holding that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality 
is not prohibited by Title VII or Section 1981”). 
 131. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255 (noting that “[e]ven if Blum is read as disposing of the sexual 
orientation claim for another reason, an alternative reason does not render as dicta this Court’s 
holding that there is no sexual orientation action under Title VII”). 
 132. Id. at 1256. 
 133. Id.; see also Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the court 
is bound by prior holdings, quoting precedent that “[w]hile an intervening decision of the Supreme 
Court can overrule the decision of a prior panel of our court, the Supreme Court decision must be 
clearly on point”); NLRB v. Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating “[w]ithout 
a clearly contrary opinion of the Supreme Court or of this court sitting en banc, we cannot overrule 
a decision of a prior panel of this court”). 
 134. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256. 
 135. Id. 
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2. Second Circuit: Zarda v. Altitude Express Inc. 
In 2010, a couple purchased tandem skydives at Altitude Express, a type of 
skydiving where the instructor is tied to the back of the client during the jump.136  
Donald Zarda, the instructor for the female client, informed her that he was gay 
to ease any discomfort because he was strapped tightly to her.137  After the 
couples skydived, the male client called Altitude Express to complain about 
Zarda’s behavior.138  Zarda was fired shortly thereafter.139  Zarda alleged that 
“he was fired from his job as a skydiving instructor because of his sexual 
orientation.”140 
He sued his former employer, Altitude Express, asserting the discrimination 
he faced was in violation of Title VII.141  The district court held that the 
“defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Zarda’s Title VII claim 
because Second Circuit precedent holds that Title VII does not protect against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”142  In his appeal, Zarda requested 
the Second Circuit to revisit the precedent set in Simonton, but the court 
declined.143  Similar to the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit affirmed 
dismissal of his case offering no additional analysis beyond its binding 
precedent.144  The court further noted that while his sexual orientation claim was 
not protected, a gender-nonconformity claim could have been pursued since that 
is actionable under Title VII.145 
3. Seventh Circuit: Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College 
Kimberly Hively, an adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College, 
applied for several full-time positions at the college over the course of five 
years.146  Despite having never received a negative evaluation as an adjunct and 
being qualified for a full-time position, the school rejected Hively’s applications 
without giving her an interview.147  The school then refused to renew her part-
time contract.148  Subsequently, Hively filed a sexual orientation discrimination 
                                               
 136. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 80 (2nd Cir. 2017), overruled by Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 79. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 80–81 (reasoning that the three-judge panel lacks the power to overturn the circuit 
precedent). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 82. 
 146. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 3:14-cv-1791, 2015 WL 926015, at *1 (N.D. Ind. 
Mar. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Hively I]. 
 147. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Hively II]. 
 148. Id. 
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claim against the school alleging that she was denied employment because of 
her sexual orientation.149 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed 
the claim citing circuit precedent that “sexual orientation is not recognized as a 
protected class under Title VII.”150  Hively appealed, but the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held the dismissal of the claim was proper as 
claims for sexual orientation are beyond the scope of Title VII.151  However, 
unlike the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the Seventh Circuit offered an analysis 
beyond circuit precedent.152 
a. EEOC’s Baldwin Decision Prompts in Depth Look at “Because of 
Sex” 
The EEOC’s Baldwin decision prompted the Seventh Circuit to take a more 
comprehensive look at discrimination “because of sex.”153  The court began its 
analysis by noting there is an inconsistency in the court system resulting from 
recognition that discrimination because of sex includes gender non-conformity 
but not sexual orientation claims.154  The court then acknowledged the difficulty 
courts have in separating the two types of claims.155  The court explained that 
“Title VII protects gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, but frequently only to the 
extent that those plaintiffs meet society’s stereotypical norms about how gay 
men or lesbian women look or act” but those “who otherwise conform to gender 
stereotyped norms in dress and mannerisms mostly lose their claims for sex 
discrimination under Title VII.”156  Because the distinction in “sex” is difficult 
                                               
 149. Hively I, 2015 WL 926015, at *1. 
 150. Id. at *3. 
 151. Hively II, 830 F.3d at 699–701. 
 152. See generally id. at 699–713 (considering the EEOC’s recent decision along with 
decisions from other circuit courts). 
 153. Id. at 702. 
 154. Id. at 704. 
 155. Id. at 704–05, 709 (7th Cir. 2016); see Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 
291 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination 
‘because of sex’ can be difficult to draw.”); see also Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 
217 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is often difficult to discern when [the plaintiff] is alleging that the various 
adverse employment actions allegedly visited upon her by [her employer] were motivated by 
animus toward her gender, her appearance, her sexual orientation, or some combination of these” 
because “the borders [between these classes] are so imprecise . . . .”); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk 
Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1065 n.5 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We recognize that distinguishing between 
failure to adhere to sex stereotypes (a sexual stereotyping claim permissible under Title VII) and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation (a claim not covered by Title VII) may be difficult.  This 
is especially true in cases in which a perception of homosexuality itself may result from an 
impression of nonconformance with sexual stereotypes.”); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 
408 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[T]he line between discrimination because of sexual orientation and 
discrimination because of sex is hardly clear.”). 
 156. Hively II, 830 F.3d at 711. 
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to make, it leads to inconsistent decisions.157  Despite identifying the 
inconsistent results from the current definition of sex and the overlap between 
sexual orientation and gender non-conformity, the court refused to change its 
stance.158  Instead, the court simply acknowledged the EEOC’s position on 
sexual orientation after Baldwin and reasoned that absent a congressional 
amendment or Supreme Court action, only its own precedent was binding.159  
Not satisfied with the results of the appeal, Hively petitioned for and was granted 
a rehearing en banc.160 
b. En Banc Seventh Circuit and Second Circuit Reverse Their Holdings 
Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit, relying on the same analysis of the three-
judge panel, reversed its holding and circuit precedent, becoming the first 
appellate court to split with other circuits.161  The en banc court first noted that 
determining whether actions taken “because of sex” included sexual orientation 
was a question of statutory interpretation within its purview.162  The court 
expressed that it could not simply rely on the legislative history when the 
Supreme Court has added to the definition of sex discrimination.163  Finding that 
no line exists between the gender nonconformity claims and those based on 
sexual orientation, the court accepted the argument that sexual orientation 
discrimination is sex discrimination.164 
Following the reversal of Hively, the Second Circuit agreed to rehear Zarda 
en banc.165  The Second Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in the current split by 
                                               
 157. Id. at 705. 
 158. Id. at 703, 718. 
 159. Id. at 703. 
 160. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 
2016). 
 161. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 350–52 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 162. Id. at 344–45.  The court stated “[o]ur interpretive task is guided instead by the Supreme 
Court’s approach in the closely related case of Oncale, where it had this to say as it addressed the 
question whether Title VII covers sexual harassment inflicted by a man on a male victim:” 
We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule 
excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII.  As some courts 
have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the 
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII.  But statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and 
it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed.  Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because 
of . . . sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” of employment.  Our holding that this includes 
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory 
requirements. 
Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998)). 
 163. Id. at 344–45. 
 164. Id. at 346. 
 165. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2017), overruled by, Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
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“conclud[ing] that sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least in part, 
by sex and is thus a subset of sex discrimination.”166  After the rehearing was 
granted, the EEOC and DOJ both weighed in on the sexual orientation 
discrimination case; however, they fell on opposite sides, creating yet another 
split.167 
B. Federal Agencies Split Over Whether “Sex” Includes Sexual Orientation 
1. EEOC: There Can Be No Sexual Orientation Discrimination Without 
Considering “Sex” 
The EEOC, the executive agency charged by Congress with interpreting and 
enforcing Title VII, weighed in on the Zarda appeal in support of finding that 
sexual orientation is discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.168  In its 
brief, the EEOC argued that sexual orientation discrimination claims necessarily 
involve impermissible consideration of a plaintiff’s sex, gender-based 
associational discrimination, and sex stereotyping.169  The EEOC notes that 
sexual orientation discrimination requires the employer to take the employee’s 
sex, as well as the sex of his or her partners, into account, which is exactly what 
Title VII prohibits.170 
Further, it asserted that sexual orientation discrimination treats individuals 
differently based on the sex of those with whom they associate, similar to 
individuals who face discrimination based on the race of their partners, which 
has been held to be a violation of Title VII.171  Much like the en banc Seventh 
Circuit, the EEOC also argued that sexual orientation discrimination should be 
prohibited because those claims are “at heart based on gender stereotypes” and 
trying to separate the two is “unworkable and leads to absurd results.”172  
However, the DOJ took the opposite position of the EEOC, despite the fact that 
both are executive agencies.173 
                                               
 166. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (reversing the long-
standing precedent of Simonton and Dawson following the analyses of the Seventh Circuit in Hively 
and the EEOC in its amicus brief). 
 167. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *1 (submitting that 
the court should reaffirm its precedent); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC, supra note 12, at 
*1 (stating that these claims fall within Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis 
of sex). 
 168. Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC, supra note 12, at *1. 
 169. Id. at *1. 
 170. Id. at *7–8; see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 358 (7th Cir. 
2017) (Posner, J., concurring) (“Fundamental to the definition of homosexuality is the sexual 
attraction to individuals of the ‘same sex.’ . . .  One cannot consider a person’s homosexuality 
without also accounting for their sex: doing so would render ‘same’ and ‘own’ meaningless.”). 
 171. Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC, supra note 12, at *13–20. 
 172. Id. at *13, 20. 
 173. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *22–23. 
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2. DOJ: The EEOC is Wrong and Does Not Speak for the United States 
The DOJ weighed in because it is tasked with enforcing Title VII against state 
and local government employers and has a “substantial and unique interest in 
the proper interpretation of Title VII.”174  In its brief, the DOJ began by asserting 
that “the EEOC is not speaking for the United States and its position about the 
scope of Title VII is entitled to no deference beyond its power to persuade.”175  
It then set forth three arguments why sexual orientation discrimination is not 
discrimination because of sex in violation of Title VII.176  The first argument 
asserts that sex discrimination is not prohibited unless men and women are 
treated unequally.177  The DOJ provided that the word “sex” means male or 
female and “sex discrimination” under Title VII means that similarly situated 
employees of different sexes are treated differently.178  Therefore, unless 
employers discriminate between members of one sex and “similarly situated” 
members of the opposite sex, there is no violation under Title VII.179  Similar to 
the Eleventh Circuit, the DOJ’s second argument was primarily based on 
precedent.180  It asserted that the long history of not protecting sexual orientation 
discrimination under Title VII, as well as congressional inaction in adding sexual 
orientation to the definition of “because of sex,” necessarily means that the 
definition should not be expanded.181  Finally, it argued that the reasoning 
advanced by the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit is not persuasive enough to 
overcome Congress’s inaction in this case.182 
III.  “BECAUSE OF SEX” SHOULD INCLUDE SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
A. How Statutory Interpretation of “Sex” Should Have Evolved 
Since Title VII was passed more than 50 years ago as part of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, societal attitudes regarding sexuality have evolved dramatically.183  
Activists from the LGBT community as well as their allies have worked 
tirelessly to advocate for equality, tolerance, and inclusion in our society.  While 
there has been some progress toward equality for the LGBT community, 
protection under Title VII’s prohibition against employment discrimination has 
not made significant progress.  Since Title VII’s enactment, courts and federal 
agencies relied upon the plain meaning of sex, the lack of legislative history, 
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congressional intent, and “precedent” to hold that discrimination “because of 
sex” does not include sexual orientation discrimination.184  Over time, the courts 
expanded the definition of “because of sex” to include sexual harassment, gender 
non-conformity, and same-sex sexual harassment,185 but after Oncale, the courts 
should have also expanded the definition to protect against sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
When Title VII was enacted, it is said that the legislators were not considering 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.186  However, the Supreme Court 
asserted that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [the law 
was passed to address] to cover reasonably comparable evils.”187  When looking 
at the number of cases filed in federal courts by employees for pervasive 
discrimination based on their sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation, 
it is clear that sexual orientation discrimination is an evil that should be protected 
against.  Instead, there is an apparent unwillingness to acknowledge sexual 
orientation discrimination beyond discussing how precedent prohibits review of 
these claims.  Further, deeply held biases against homosexuality have allowed 
for very limited protection for LGBT employees. 
B. Why the EEOC, Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit Got It Right 
The EEOC, the Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit all took the position that 
it was time to stop allowing employers to discriminate against employees based 
on their sexual orientation.188  This was the right decision for several reasons.  
Discrimination itself has negative consequences for employees including, but 
not limited to, financial instability, decreased morale and productivity, and the 
creation of  physical and mental issues.189  By restricting LGBT individuals from 
bringing forth claims of sexual orientation discrimination, courts allow 
employers to inflict those consequences on LGBT individuals without 
repercussions. 
                                               
 184. See, eg., Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-22290, 192 WL 5436, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) 
(“[W]e believe that only discrimination based on being male or female is prohibited by Title VII, 
and that the cases proscribing hostile environment sexual harassment are not to the contrary, we 
affirm the district court.”); Powell v. Read’s, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977) (holding 
that a complaint did not state a cause of action because Title VII focused on discrimination because 
of the status of sex or because of sexual stereotyping, rather than on discrimination due to a change 
in sex). 
 185. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
 186. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *10. 
 187. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (holding that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual 
harassment is actionable under Title VII). 
 188. See supra Sections I.C.2, II.A.3, II.A.3.b. 
 189. See generally Wizsom Powell Hammond et al., Workplace Discrimination and 
Depressive Symptoms: A Study of Multi-Ethnic Hospital Employees, 2 RACE & SOC. PROBLEMS 19 
(2010) (studying the effects of workplace discrimination on hospital employees); Neslie A. 
Etheridge, Effects of Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S ARMY (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.army.mil/article/142799/effects_of_discrimination_in_the_workplace. 
206 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 68:185 
No one should have to live and work in fear of discrimination for who they 
are.  Yet LGBT employees are often unable to be themselves and must hide their 
lives while at work out of fear that they may face adverse actions without legal 
recourse.  By finding that sexual orientation is discrimination because of sex, the 
EEOC, Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit have opened an avenue previously 
foreclosed to the LGBT community.  This provides an opportunity for members 
of the LGBT community to seek and receive relief when they suffer adverse 
employment actions. 
C. The Battle of the Agencies Could Muddy the Waters 
Generally speaking, the Executive branch agencies are expected to be in sync.  
Yet the EEOC and DOJ oppose one another in defining what is discrimination 
“because of sex” under Title VII in regards to sexual discrimination.  Both 
agencies are tasked with enforcement of Title VII,190 so the differing opinions 
lead to the potential for confusion in deciding future claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination under Title VII. 
Some states have enacted laws that protect LGBT individuals from sexual 
orientation discrimination.191  However, there are still states that do not 
subscribe to equality for the LGBT community.192  Without further guidance, 
there will likely be courts subscribing to the EEOC’s definition and others to the 
DOJ’s definition.  This will likely lead to more inconsistent court opinions, much 
like the inconsistent gender non-conformity claims.  For this reason, guidance is 
needed from Congress or the Supreme Court. 
In the past, members of Congress tried repeatedly to enact legislation to 
protect employees from sexual orientation discrimination, but the attempts 
failed.193  Instead of attempting to enact separate legislation, Congress should 
explicitly define sex to include sexual orientation to eliminate any confusion in 
the courts.  Yet Congress’s history of inaction in this area makes it unlikely that 
it will weigh in.  However, the Supreme Court has acted to eliminate 
discrimination faced by the LGBT community, and should act further to 
eliminate any confusion and resolve the definition of sex.194 
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Given the courts progress toward equality for LGBT individuals,195 they 
should take the position that sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination 
“because of sex.”  In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court identified same-sex sexual 
intimacy as a fundamental right and recognized that sexual orientation is both 
immutable and a “normal expression of human sexuality . . . .”196  Obergefell 
lays even more groundwork for the Court to expand the definition of “because 
of sex” to protect workers from sexual orientation discrimination.  Following its 
own guidance, the Court should resolve the split by finding that, despite not 
being the evil Congress intended to eradicate, sexual orientation is nevertheless 
an evil that should be prohibited under Title VII. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Many arguments can be made for why and how the prohibition against 
discrimination based on sex should include sexual orientation discrimination.  
Because heterosexuality is considered the societal norm, LGBT individuals face 
discrimination that generally involves sex stereotyping or gender non-
conformity.  Following Price Waterhouse, courts allowed gender non-
conformity claims to proceed under Title VII.  However, courts have tried to 
draw a line between distinguishing sex stereotyping or gender non-conformity 
claims from sexual orientation claims using sexual orientation as a basis for not 
allowing LGBT plaintiffs relief under Title VII.  However, as the EEOC, 
Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit have noted, gender non-conformity is at the 
root of all sexual orientation claims and, by proxy, discrimination that takes this 
into account is discrimination because of sex.  As such, the Supreme Court 
should allow LGBT individuals access to Title VII as recourse for employment 
discrimination because of their sexual orientation. 
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